The Web may critically transform the way we understand the activity of proving. The Web as a collaborative medium allows the active participation of people with different backgrounds, interests, viewpoints, and styles. Mathematical formal proofs are inadequate for capturing Web-based proofs. This article claims that Web provings can be studied as a particular type of Goguen's proof-events. Web-based proof-events have a social component, communication medium, prover-interpreter interaction, interpretation process, understanding and validation, historical component, and styles. To demonstrate its claim, the (...) article discusses the Kumo and Polymath projects, both of which employ Web-based communication as part of proving. Web proving is a novel type of proving activity that may have a serious impact on the change in mathematical practices, despite the fact that it is not currently a universally acceptable methodology. (shrink)

The Web may critically transform the way we understand the activity of proving. The Web as a collaborative medium allows the active participation of people with different backgrounds, interests, viewpoints, and styles. Mathematical formal proofs are inadequate for capturing Web‐based proofs. This chapter claims that Web provings can be studied as a particular type of Goguen's proof‐events. Web‐based proof‐events have a social component, communication medium, prover‐interpreter interaction, interpretation process, understanding and validation, historical component, and styles. To demonstrate its claim, the (...) chapter discusses the Kumo and Polymath projects, both of which employ Web‐based communication as part of proving. Web proving is a novel type of proving activity that may have a serious impact on the change in mathematical practices, despite the fact that it is not currently a universally acceptable methodology. The Web may critically transform the way we understand the activity of proving. The Web as a collaborative medium allows the active participation of people with different backgrounds, interests, viewpoints, and styles. Mathematical formal proofs are inadequate for capturing Web‐based proofs. This chapter claims that Web provings can be studied as a particular type of Goguen's proof‐events. Web‐based proof‐events have a social component, communication medium, prover‐interpreter interaction, interpretation process, understanding and validation, historical component, and styles. To demonstrate its claim, the chapter discusses the Kumo and Polymath projects, both of which employ Web‐based communication as part of proving. Web proving is a novel type of proving activity that may have a serious impact on the change in mathematical practices, despite the fact that it is not currently a universally acceptable methodology. (shrink)

The Web may critically transform the way we understand the activity of proving. The Web as a collaborative medium allows the active participation of people with different backgrounds, interests, viewpoints, and styles. Mathematical formal proofs are inadequate for capturing Web‐based proofs. This article claims that Web provings can be studied as a particular type of Goguen's proof‐events. Web‐based proof‐events have a social component, communication medium, prover‐interpreter interaction, interpretation process, understanding and validation, historical component, and styles. To demonstrate its claim, the (...) article discusses the Kumo and Polymath projects, both of which employ Web‐based communication as part of proving. Web proving is a novel type of proving activity that may have a serious impact on the change in mathematical practices, despite the fact that it is not currently a universally acceptable methodology. (shrink)

The concept of proof can be studied from many different perspectives. Many types of proofs have been developed throughout history such as apodictic, dialectical, formal, constructive and non-constructive proofs, proofs by visualisation, assumption-based proofs, computer-generated proofs, etc. In this paper, we develop Goguen’s general concept of proof-events and the methodology of algebraic semiotics, in order to define the concept of mathematical style, which characterizes the proofs produced by different cultures, schools or scholars. In our view, style can be defined as (...) a semiotic meta-code that depends on the underlying mode of signification (semiosis), the selected code and the underlying semiotic space and determines the individual mode of integration (selection, combination, blending) into a narrative structure (proof). Finally, we examine certain historical types of styles of mathematical proofs, to elucidate our viewpoint. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to increase our understanding of what archaic verse epitaphs meant to contemporary readers. Section I suggests their fundamental message was praise of the deceased, expressed in forms characteristic of poetic encomium in its broad, rhetorical sense, i.e., praise poetry. In section II, the conventions of encomium in the epitaphs are compared to the iconographic conventions of funerary art. I conclude that verse inscriptions and grave markers, not only communicate the same message of praise, but (...) do so in a formally parallel manner. Section III, drawing on Pindar as a preserver of archaic thinking, attributes the parallelism between verse epitaph and grave marker to their common debt to funerary ritual. The epigrams will be seen to share with their monuments the goal of memorializing this ritual. (shrink)

This rich and varied collection of essays addresses some of the most fundamental human questions through the lenses of philosophy, literature, religion, politics, and theology. Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey have fashioned an interdisciplinary consideration of such perennial and enduring issues as the relationship between nature and history, nature and grace, reason and revelation, classical philosophy and Christianity, modernity and postmodernity, repentance and self-limitation, and philosophy and politics.

In this paper, we suggest the broader concept of proof-event, introduced by Joseph Goguen, as a fundamental methodological tool for studying proofs in history of mathematics. In this framework, proof is understood not as a purely syntactic object, but as a social process that involves at least two agents; this highlights the communicational aspect of proving. We claim that historians of mathematics essentially study proof-events in their research, since the mathematical proofs they face in the extant sources involve many (...) informal components, often not completely formalizable, and convey some kind of semantic content calling for understanding and verification. We illustrate the application of this methodological approach in some outstanding historical cases, paying particular attention to the process of proof interpretation that makes a proof-event alive. Finally, we suggest a classification of proof-events, according to the conditions imposed upon problem-solving. This enables us to speak about broad classes of proof-events in history of mathematics that share a common characteristic. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. My position in this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fundamentally a part (...) of her theory. In Section I, I briefly outline a recent defence of presentism due to Craig, and argue that a flaw in this defence highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I undertake an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, I consider different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. In Section III, I also consider whether the presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity, and argue that she cannot. Finally, I conclude that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry. (shrink)

Analytic debates about truth are wide-ranging, but certain key themes tend to crop up time and again. The three themes that we will examine in this paper are (i) the nature and behaviour of the ordinary concept of truth, (ii) the meaning of discourse about truth, and (iii) the nature of the property truth. We will start by offering a brief overview of the debates centring on these themes. We will then argue that cross-linguistic experimental philosophy has an indispensable yet (...) underappreciated role to play in all of these debates. Recognising the indispensability of cross-linguistic experimental philosophy should compel philosophers to significantly revise the ways in which they inquire about truth. It should also prompt analytic philosophers more generally to consider whether similar revisions might be necessary elsewhere in the field. (shrink)

The fundamental issues raised by Gertrude Stein in her "radical language experiment" bear a remarkable resemblance to the problems posed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later philosophy of language . Wittgenstein's philosophy is an important meta-view infusing our perception of modern and postmodern literature with his contention that philosophy is concerned most centrally with the description of the use of language, his notion of language as practice. Stein was the first writer who fully incorporated the idea of universal indeterminacy into (...) her work. Carefully utilizing such stylistic devices as repetition, her exploitation of both the axis of selection and that of combination, and rejection of logical relations and formal systems, she questioned traditional notions of meaning-making. She accepted readily the vagueness of meaning inherent in language, and by molding language through associative meaning and context, she set stage for much of the writing that we now call post-modern. For Stein meaning arises not in terms of rules of interpretation, but in ways in which language is used: in the form of her composition. ;This dissertation examines ways in which exploring connections between the work of the two can refine our understanding of each in turn. In the context of a general introduction to the conceptual connections between Stein and Wittgenstein, Chapter I concludes with a presentation of the key biblio-bigraphical facts about the careers of both and rejection of any possible direct contact or influence. Chapter II focuses on the related biographical connections of Stein and conceptual connections of Wittgenstein to Pragmatism and the ways in which relations can be demonstrated between the ideas of all three. In Chapters III, IV and V, stressing intertextuality rather than indebtedness, I give close readings of the work of Stein and Wittgenstein, identifying the major contentions that they share, and showing how Stein's creative works put Wittgensteinian theories into practice. Throughout, my major concern will be to demonstrate how connections between the two writers can help to clarify our understanding of each and enable us to appreciate their mutual contributions to notions in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The "Thinking of Thinking" in MetaphysicsA.9 JOSEPH G. DE FILIPPO a+~6v &Qa voE[, e~eQ ~o~t ~6 XQ&~O~OV, xetl. I~o~tv ~1VdOloLgvo1]o~t0g v6"qotg. (A.9, 1o74b33-34) Therefore it thinks itself, if indeed it is most powerful, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. Thus culminates Aristotle's treatment of God's activity in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The conclusion seems transparent. God is an intellect (vo~Sg); since he is also (...) the best thing, and it is absurd that he should think anything worse than himself, he therefore thinks himself. And since he is nothing other than a thinking (v6"qotg), what he thinks of is thinking (vo~loEe0g). "Thinking of thinking," however, is a notion that is as ambiguous in ancient Greek as it is in English. It is just not clear what sort of thing such a reflexively self-thinking mind would be, though it might seem natural to construe the activity of Aristotle's God as somehow an act of pure self-awareness, self-consciousness or self-knowledge. On such an understanding God would be a separately existing consciousness, with himself or his activity as the only object of that consciousness. In 196 9 R. Norman published a paper which disputed this sort of interpretation.' He argued that when one considers Aristotle's theory of, R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969): 63-74 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji [London, 1979], 93-1o2). While I a-m indebted to Norman's basic approach, my treatment of God's self-thought differs substantially from his in two respects. First, although it isessential to recognize that in Aristotle human thought too thinks itself, this does not justify the conclusion that God's thinking is "of the same kind as our own normal abstract thought" (73). As 1shall argue below in section 4, the characterization of the Prime Mover as v6"qoLgvo~o~t0g is meant specifically to differentiate its activity from the selfthinking of human volSg;human thought could never be characterized as v6"qotgvofioEt0g.Secondly, Norman does not isolate the real source of A.9's argument, which, as l shall argue, is the potential conflict between Aristotle's own physical and psychological theories. M. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, 1988), 229-45, also argues against Norman's thesis that human and divine thought are the same in kind. [543] 544 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 volSg from De Anima III.4-8, it is clear that the conception of God as a selfthinking mind does not entail that he engages in self-contemplation in the normal sense of the term. On Norman's interpretation, God thinks himself because he thinks a definite content with which he is numerically identical, according to the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of vo~g with its object of thought (vo~lx6v). To describe this act simply as self-contemplation belies the fact that its object must have an intelligible content, which in the case of God is not adequately described as his "self," for this self would indeed be nothing more than an act of self-contemplation. While many commentators have followed Norman in recognizing that the description of God as "thinking himself" is drawn from the De Anima's characterization of self-thinking, there has persisted a tendency to interpret Aristotle 's God as engaged in an act of pure self-awareness or under some similar description.' The reason for this persistence is due, I believe, to a crucial difference between chapters 7 and 9 of book A. Whereas both chapters characterize the Prime Mover (PM) as a self-thinker, in chapter 9 he is also said to be ~1 v61]otg vo~loec0g V6tlOtg (the thinking of thinking), which understandably appears to be a much more specific delineation of his thought content. A. 7 tells us that the PM is a vofJg that thinks itself (to72b18-3o); according to De Anima III. 4 that simply is what voa)g does at the highest level of actuality, since it... (shrink)

Part 1: What is philosophy? Introduction -- A brief history of philosophy -- Part II: The evolution of philosophy. Reason -- Sense experience -- Reason, sense, and intuition -- Self-preservation/power -- Desire/Free will -- Science -- Language -- Additional human activities -- Philosophy : the lessons learned -- Part III: The philosophy of conscious energy. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) -- The philosophy of conscious energy -- Comments.

The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. (...) Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a sine qua non for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axiom ? The tradition views only the life?long commitment as real. Viewing rationality as experimental open?mindedness, we may consider a rationalist unable to retreat into any life?long commitment ? even commitment to science. In this way the logic of the tu quoque argument is made irrelevant: anyone able to face the choice between rationality and commitment is already beyond such a choice; it is one thing to be still naïve and another ? and paradoxical ? thing to return to one's naïveté. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of ‘reasonable’ argumentation in Generation of Animals III.10. Its aim is to develop an alternative to the dialectical construal of reasonable argumentation in Aristotle recently favoured by Robert Bolton. On the basis of a close textual analysis I show that the reasonable arguments deployed in Generation of Animals III.10 do not appeal to endoxa or reputable beliefs per se. Instead, they rely upon general facts about animals established by empirical induction. This implies that, contra Bolton, (...) not all reasonable arguments in Aristotle are dialectical; some, in fact, are thoroughly empirical and scientific. I conclude by suggesting that such empirical reasonable arguments even have a place in the De Caelo, the treatise that Bolton primarily focused upon when developing his interpretation. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Contributors ix -- Foreword by Douglas A. Boyd andJoseph D. Straubhaar xiii -- Preface byMariaHenson xv -- Acknowledgments xvii -- Part I. Introduction 1 -- Chapter 1. Journalism as a Mission: Ethics and Purpose -- from an International Perspective -- by Joseph B. Atkins 3 -- Chapter 2. Chaos and Order: Sacrificing the Individual for the -- Sake of Social Harmony -- by John C. Merrill 17 -- Part II. In the United States and Latin (...) America 37 -- Chapter 3. Ways of a Muckraker -- by Jerry Mitchell 39 -- Chapter 4. A Sinister Zone of Likeness: Journalists as Heroes and -- Villains in the U.S. South and in Central and Eastern -- Europe -- by Joseph B. Atkins 45 -- Chapter 5. From Collusion to Independence: The Press, The Ruling -- Party, and Democratization in Mexico -- byMichaelSnodgrass 55 -- Chapter 6. The Outspoken Journalist Is an Expression, a Symbol -- of Colombia -- by Stephen E Jackson 69 -- Part III. In Europe 77 -- Chapter 7. The Stranger: Minorities and Their Treatment -- in the German Media -- by Georg Ruhrmann 79 -- Chapter 8. Between State Control and the Bottom Line: -- Journalism and Journalism Ethics in Hungary -- by Ildiko Kaposi and Eva Vajda 91 -- Chapter 9. SITA: Slovakia's First Independent News Service and -- Its Battles with the Huey Long of the Danube -- byPavol Mudry 101 -- Chapter 10. Holding Politicians' Feet to the Fire in Slovenia -- by Bernard Nezmah 111 -- Part IV. In the Middle East and Africa 121 -- Chapter 11. Lebanese Television: Caught Between the -- Government and the Private Sector -- by Nabil Dajani 123 -- Chapter 12. Press Freedom and the Crisis of Ethical Journalism -- in Southern Africa -- by Regina Jere-Malanda 143 -- Chapter 13. Nigerian Press Ethics and the Politics of Pluralism -- by Minabere Ibelema 153 -- Part V. In South and East Asia 169 -- Chapter 14. The Indian Press: Covering an Enigma -- byJayanti Ram-Chandran 171 -- Chapter 15. Palace Intrigue in Katmandu and the Press in Nepal -- byAkhilesh Upadhyay 181 -- Chapter 16. The Press in Japan: Job Security versus -- Journalistic Mission -- by Takehiko Nomura 187 -- Part VI. Three Journalists and Their Missions 201 -- Chapter 17. A Journey in Journalism: From Idealism -- to Bankruptcy -- by Neil White III 203 -- Chapter 18. Reclaiming Responsibility: A Journalist and Artist -- in the Catholic Worker Movement -- by Chuck Trapkus 211 -- Chapter 19. Ryszard Kapuscinski: The Empathetic Existentialist -- by Joseph B. Atkins and Bernard Nezmah 217 -- Postscript The White Rose: On the Martyrdom of Student Pamphleteers in -- Nazi Germany and Their Legacy -- by Joseph B. Atkins 227 -- References 233 -- Index 243. (shrink)

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract also in Chinese. This paper explores the need for and place of input from local cultures and religious traditions when addressing the highly complex questions that frequently arise in the field of bioethics, something which is often overlooked and even questioned in much of the relevant academic literature. It begins by examining the historical roots of religious bioethics and the secularization of the discipline before then recounting the experience of the Bioethics, (...) Multiculturalism and Religion Project of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights. Over the past 12 years, this Project has brought together Christians, Buddhists, Confucians, Daoists, Jews, Hindus, Muslims, and secular ethicists in eight encounters to discuss bioethical topics. First, the paper describes the different orientations, goals and methodological changes involved in these encounters. The methodology of meeting evolving is a search for possible convergence or common ground in the Project. The paper then addresses the most salient questions that have emerged these years. They are i) the problem of universalism vs. pluralism, which is witnessed in global bioethics vs. local diversity; ii) the East-West divide on the conception of human rights vs. duties; iii) cross-cultural and interreligious dialogue goals are framed as convergence, consensus or conversation; and iv) the ongoing issue of science and faith as different traditions confront modernity. 本文在探討解決生命倫理學領域經常出現的高度複雜問題時，當地文化和宗教傳統的涉入是必要的，也是應該具有一定地位的，但這一點在許多相關的學術文獻中卻經常被忽視，甚至被質疑。本文首先考察宗教生命倫理學的歷史 根源和該學科的世俗化，然後敘述聯合國教科文組織生命倫理學和人權教席的“生命倫理學、多元文化與宗教”國際項目的經驗。在過去12年裡，該項目將基督教、佛教、儒教、道教、猶太教、印度教、穆斯林教及世俗倫理學 的學者聚集在一起，進行了8次會議，討論生命倫理學課題。本文首先描述這些會議所涉及的不同取向、目標和方法論的演變。方法論的演變是為了尋求項目可能的趨同點或共同點。然後，本文討論這些年出現的最突出的問題。 它們是：i)普遍主義與多元主義問題，即體現在全球生命倫理學與地方倫理學之間的問題；ii)東西方在人權與義務概念上的分歧；iii)跨文化和跨宗教對話的目標應該被框定為趨同、共識還是對談；以及iv)在不同 傳統面對現代性時所持績存在的科學與信仰之間的問題。. (shrink)

Research suggests that reducing rates of drug addiction requires a range of physical spaces where drug users and counselors can meet, build community, and work together. The efficacy of this ‘social infrastructure,’ however, depends not just on how its shared spaces facilitate access to social networks, but on how institutional rules and norms govern the social interaction that takes place in those spaces. I suggest that institutional norms nurture sobriety to the extent that the social arrangements they foster are (i) (...) discretionary, since individuals trying to re-establish sobriety have heterogeneous social preferences; (ii) unconditional, since individuals’ efforts to re-achieve sobriety frequently involve setbacks; and (iii) low-pressure, since individuals may find extraneous turmoil damaging to their renascent sobriety. To the extent that institutional norms facilitate contrary social arrangements, shared settings are liable to backfire—to undermine or at least fail to nurture sobriety—which I illustrate using the case of sobriety-oriented organizations in the Boston area. Critically, while the first two aspects are governed largely by intra-organizational norms, the third is governed by norms between multiple sobriety-oriented organizations. Upholding healthful local norms, then, demands commitment at both the organization and system levels. (shrink)

La cuestión de si los lenguajes intensionalesson más expresivos que los lenguajes nointensionalessurge en el marco de unaperspect i va semánt i ca de l as t eorí as.Desde esta perspectiva, la cuestión esesta. ¿Hay clases modelo que se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que usanconceptos intensionales que no se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que no usanconceptos intensionales? Se sugiere unaformulación precisa de esta cuestión, perono se ofrece una respuesta.Para aproxi marse a est a cuest i ón, seresume la teoría de modelos de (...) primerorden [II] y se revisa el enfoque semánticode las teorías que emplea incrementost eóri cos, no i nt ensi onal es, de pri merorden [III].Los i nc r e me nt os t e ór i c os de pr i me rorden se bosquejan pero no se definenr i g u r o s a me n t e [ I V] . E s t e l e n g u a j ei n t e n s i o n a l pr o po r c i o n a e l a p a r a t op a r a a t r i b u i r u s o d e l l e n g u a j e yact i t udes i nt ens i onal es a i ndi vi duoscuyo comportami ento es el obj eto deinvestigación. También proporciona elaparato para habl ar sobre traducci óndel lenguaj e atribuido al lenguaj e delinvestigador.La cuestión inicial se convierte entoncesen si hay clases modelo que se puedanc a r a c t e r i z a r me d i a n t e i n c r e me n t o sintencionales de lógica de primer ordenq ue n o pue de n s e r c a pt ur a do s po rincrementos teóricos no-intensionales [V].The ques t i on of whet her i nt ens i onallanguages are more expressive than nonintensional languages is raised within the framework of a semantic view of theories. Fromthis perspective, the question isthis. Are there model classes that can becharacterized by theories using intensionalconcepts that cannot be characterizedby theories that do not use intensionalconcepts? A precise formulation of thisquestion is suggested, but no answer isgiven.To approach this question, model theory offirst order theories is summarized [II] andthe semantic approach to theories usingnon-intensional, theoretical augmentationsof first order theories is reviewed [III].I n t e n s i o n a l a u g me n t a t i o n s o f f i r s torder theories are sketched [IV] but notr i gor ous l y de f i ne d. Thi s i nt e ns i onall anguage provi des t he apparat us f orattributing language use and intensionalattitudes to individuals whose behavioris the object investigation. It also providesapparatus for talking about translationf r om t he at t r i but e d l anguage t o t heinvestigator’s language.T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o me swhet her t here are model cl asses t hatc a n be c ha r a c t e r i z e d by i nt e ns i ona laugmentations of first order logic thatcannot be captured by non-intensionaltheoretical augmentations [V]. (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of closeness in the ethical use of intention. In section I, attempts inspired by Anscombe to use a “coarse grained” understanding of intention, to deal with certain difficult cases, are rejected. In section II it is argued that the difficult cases can be addressed using other moral principles. In section III a more detailed account of intention is set out, analysing intention as a reason for action, and in section IV two paradoxes apparently created by (...) this account are addressed: on the contrast between intentions and intentional action, and the difference between killing a group of people together or individually. In section V another set of cases is considered, to test how this account of intention handles the intention of harm. Section VI considers the objection that an agent may cause what is a harm without intending it as a harm. (shrink)

The article is intended to, in Sections I and II, flesh out and put within a metaphilosophical framework the theoretical argument first made in 2002 in “Do Internet Stings Directed at Pedophiles Capture Offenders or Create Offenders? And Allied Questions” (Sexuality & Culture 6(4): 73–100), with some modifications (See note 14). Where there are differences, I stand by this version as the final version of the argument. Section III addresses three experimental or empirical studies which might be thought to contradict (...) or confirm the data of the 2002 study. Section IV compares what we have done with the one other jurisprudential argument made by Summer 2005. Section V discusses why, despite the evidence and the arguments, these sting operations are popular with prosecutors and the public alike. Section VI comments on why my empirical study dating to 2002 does not appear to have gained wide acceptance, and what, if anything, can be said about this. -/- Note: The unusual length (for me) of the article is justified by its being data-driven. (shrink)